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SHALL THE TWAIN EVER MEET?: On the Cancellation of the June
1997 Meeting of the Pope of Rome and the Patriarch of Moscow•
by Ralph Della Cava
Ralph Della Cava (Roman Catholic) is Professor of History, Queens College, CUNY
Flushing, NY I I367- I597 & Senior Research Associate, ILA.IS, Columbia University

SUMMARY
At the start of I998,

rumors

- as well as denials - are once again flying of an imminent, historic meeting

between the Pope ofRome and the Patriarch ofMoscow and AllRussia. To put that prospect into perspective,
the present article explores the I6 June I997 decision of the Holy Synod, the powerful interim governing body
of theRussian Orthodox Church, to cancel the previously scheduled encounter of the two church leaders later
that month. It also examines differing explanations offered for that decision and the background to some of the
continuing misunderstandings between the two confessions.

Two Steps Backward?
June, 1997 may go do�n on record as the month and year when the Russian Orthodox Church, claimant
of the loyalty of upwards of some I00 million nominal believers inRussia, Ukraine, and Belarus alone, took
two decisive steps - back into its past!
That past, marked by both an abiding suspicion of other world faiths and a territorially-based
ecclesiastical monopoly buttressed by, and oft historically subordinate to, state power, would now seem - after
seven tempering years of religious liberty - to be destined to repeat.
The first step in this apparent about-face was the Russian Church's last-minute cancellation on the tenth
of June 1997 of what would have been an historic encounter near Vienna- the first since the founding of
Christianity among the Slavs a millennium ago - between a Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and a Pontiff
of the Roman Catholic Church.1 Moreover, Pope John Paul II, as Patriarch of the West, a title conferred on
his predecessors by a once undivided Christianity, would have in effect met Patriarch Aleksiy II, his Russian

1 01997, 1998 Completed 29 June 1997 Revised 1.5 January 1998. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION WITHOUT
AUTHOR'S PERMISSION. E-Mail Addresses: rd79@columbia.edu dellacav@qcvaxa.acc.qc.edu

1 The decision was made by the Holy Synod at its meeting on I0 June 1997; the official document
was published in Department of External Church Relations, Moscow Patriarchate, Informatsionniy

Bvulleten' (Moscow), 8:97 (17 June 1997), 1 -3, and apparently announced the following day. News of it
appeared in Bruno Bartoloni, "Patriarch Calls off Pope Summit," The Moscow Tribune, I4 June I997, I.
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Orthodox confrere, on eccelesiastical common groWld.2
The second step backwards was surely the initially tacit, but then enthusiastic acceptance by the Moscow
Patriarchate (over which Aleksiy II presides) of a bill that it had in fact long sought and for bener than three
years helped fashion. Approved by a 3 37 to 5 vote of the Dwna on the eighteenth of JW1e 1997, and signed
into law on the following twenty-sixth of September by Russia's President, Boris Yeltsin, the measure not only
severely limits freedom of conscience and religion throughout the federation, but also invests Orthodoxy with
privileges denied most other faiths.3

Optimistic or Pessimistic Future?

At issue in the remarks which follow is not how both these steps will play themselves out in the coming
days and months. Indeed, it is possible to imagine scenarios of quite opposite extremes.
The optimistic one posits that the two aging and ailing patriarchs will fmd it within their failing powers
to reschedule the long-sought meeting sometime in the near future. Each has affirmed his will to do so.� With
respect to the new law, expectations remain high, if not entirely well-foWlded, that the Russian Federation's
Supreme CoW1. will strike it down as a flagrant violation of Article 28 of the 199 3 Constitution guaranteeing
religious liberty and in violation of many of the international treaties to which Russia is a party.$

2Historically speaking, the five apostolic patriarchates prior to the Great Schism of I054
were: Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Rome and Constantinople. After that date, all but Rome and
five others -- Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia-- comprise the nine patriarchates which
along with the four metroplitan or archdiocesan churches of Cyprus, Greece, Poland and Albania
make up the autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox churches in commWlion with each other under
the "priority" of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
But, the complexity-- of history, organization, and doctrinal differences-- of the thirteen
above and some forty other Eastern Christian churches cannot be dealt with here; instead, see the
brief, but clear discussion by Ronald G. Roberson, CSP, The Eastern Christian Churches- A Brief
Survey. (Rome: Edizioni "Orientalia Christiana," 1993), 4th Revised Edition.
3 The "New Law" as it was passed by the Duma and in the subsequent version signed by
President Boris Yeltsin in September 1997 over the protests of several Western governments and
confessions are available in an English translation from the Keston News Service, Oxford, England at
the following e-mail address: Keston.institute@keston.org
4 Aleksiy II expressed his hope of rescheduling their meeting in a letter to the Pope, cited in
·"Meeting of Patriarch, Pope Canceled over Differences," The Moscow Times, 14 JW1e 1997, 3.; John
Paul II reiterated his intention to meet in his Sunday homily at St. Peter's on22 JW1e 1997, as reported by
the BBC on the night of22 JW1e 1997 and by Reuters in a dispatch from Vatican City and swnmarized in
"Pope Appeals for Christians to Reconcile," The Moscow Times,24 JWle 1997,4. See the discussion
later in the text.
5 This view is largely expressed by West European and American observers and by local
Russian human rights groups which, despite shortages of manpower and finances, are intent on testing
the new Jaw in Russia's cotirts: see Pavel Mirzoev, "Natural Monopoly of the Patriarchate",Russkiy
Tclegraf, 14 January 1998 as re- transmitted by the San Francisco-based, on-line news service, Holy
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But, a pessimistic scenario is equally conceivable in light of the recent legislative victory. On the one
side, outspoken moderate leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) may prove unable to beat back
mounting offensives by ultra-nationalist clerics who denounce every act of ecumenism as a heresy and consider
a meeting of the Patriarch with a "Polish" pope an outrage against Russian patriotism. 6 On the other hand,
some of these same moderates may also prove unwilling to stand up fully for the rights of other confessions.
In fact, in the recent past, church leaders in general have repeatedly and publicly labeled religious bodies
such as Scientology and the Japan-based Aum Shinrikyo as destructive "sects" and "cults". At times, some
have failed to make little or no distinction between those bodies on the one hand and Roman Catholics,
Baptists and most main-line Protestant confessions on the other. Just as often they have condemned nearly all
of these confessions outright for unfairly "proselytizing" on Russian soil, which the Patriarchate considers an
exclusively "Orthodox domain."'
Which of the scenarios or what mix of the two will describe reality will surely become clearer over the
coming weeks and months. For now, however, what may be useful to explore are the dramatically changing
circumstances that have lead to the present state of affairs.
In this tex1, only the issue of the Pope's and Patriarch's meeting can be dealt with.
Steps Toward the Failed Encounter

Indeed, their encounter stands a good chance chance of being salvaged. Both sides have eagerly sought
to meet for over two years.
During the papal visit to Hungary in September 1996, and apparently at the initiative of several local
Catholic prelates and their government, a meeting of the two religious leaders was scheduled at the celebrated
Benedictine monastery in Pannonhalma, the founding of which - fittingly and symbolically - antedates the
Great Schism of 1054. But, at the last minute the Patriarch is reported to have begged off as pressures from
among ultra-nationalist clerics within the ROC were upped excessively.

Trinity, available at: news@holy-trinity.org
6

This has been expressed by Russian clerical ultra-nationalists and most recently spelled out

by Serbian Orthodox who are intent on exiting from the WCC (see note 30, below); the clearly pejorative
reference to the "Polish" pope was reported on good authority to have been made recently by a well-placed

Orthodox clergyman.

7 This exclusivity is elaborated by Orthodox ecclesiastics as "canonical territory," a concept

rejected by most other faiths, but recognized in the breach by some.
Concerning sects and cults, see the directory published by the Missionary Department of the
Moscow Patriarchate: Missionerskiy Otdel Moskovskogo Patriarchate Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi,
Novve Religioznye Organizatsii Rossii Destruktivnogo i Okkvl'tnogo Charaktera - Spravochnik
(Belgorod, 1997). The preface contains important references to the "inapplicability" of the current

guarantees of religious liberty (presumably the 1990 Law on Freedom of Religion and Conscience)
and of the "American" and "European models" of church-state relations and religious freedom (presumably
the wide spread acceptance of religious toleration and separation of church and state).
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Then in November 1996 - according to well-placed sources - it was the Russians who eagerly proposed
that both sides try again. The occasion would be the Second European Ecumenical Assembly which was held
in Graz, Austria between 23 and 29 June 1997 under the sponsorship of Europe's Christian churches. 8
Initially, it was suggested that not only the patriarchs of Moscow and Rome convene, but also that of Annenia
as well as the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople-lstanbul.9 The latter is generally regarded throughout
the Orthodox world as the "first among equals" and has been historically accorded the power, attributed to no
other authority, to shape the consensus that either grants or confums autonomy and autocephaly (degrees of
self-governance, from partial to full, respectively) to local and national churches.
Since early 1996, the Russians have been at odds with Constantinople over the latter's reconfirmation of
the original autonomy of the Orthodox Church of Estonia. With the Soviet occupation of the Baltics in 1940,
the Estonian Church had involuntarily fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. With
national independence in 1991, however, Estonian politicians of all persuasions, no less than churchmen of
the Orthodox minority, contended for a return to pre-war ecclesiastical liberties.
Moscow vehemently opposed it, but later formally relented and a face-saving, middle-term solution was
hastily agreed to. Russian relations with Constantinople, however, have remained embittered. Might not then
the meeting of patriarchs in Graz - where, under the theme of "Reconciliation - Gift of God and Source of New
Life," some ten thousand faithful from hundreds of confessions were expected to gather - have been envisioned
by Moscow as a chance to mend their differences?
On 30 May, 1997, His All Holiness, Bartholomeos I, the Ecumenical Patriarch, had evidently concluded

it had not. From Istanbul, he announced his decision to "postpone" - in effect, cancel - his expected
participation in both the Assembly and his planned official state visit to Austria. He further charged that
contrary to its expressed purpose, the Assembly was being turned into a "confrontation" between church
0

leaders and that he did '"not wish to participate in a tug of war pitting supremacies against one another."'1

Sources close to the Patriarch alleged that the cancellation came in the wake of "attempts by the Vatican
and the Moscow Patriarchate to exploit the congress,"1 1 while subsequent press coverage indeed suggests that

8 The official sponsors were the Conference of European Churches and the Council of European
[Roman Catholic] Bishops' Conferences. The world press had given this event considerable attention;
one starting point is John Thavis, "Vatican Working on Papal Meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch,"
Catholic News Service, 12 May 1997.
9 Based on a dispatch from Reuters, "Orthodox patriarchs may make historic meeting with
Pope," 09 May 1997.
0
1 See "Vartholomeos cancels official visit to Austria," Athens News Agency Bulletin, (No
1200), 31 May 1997; he added, "The events in Graz aim at reconciliation between Christians and
should not be used to promote personal interests."

18

at some point between November 19% and late May 1997, Bartholomeos I and the Armenian church leaderoriginally proposed by the Russians as participants - had somehow been deliberately dealt out of any "pan
patriarchal" encounter. By early June, the venue also had shifted from Graz to Vienna, and still again to an
ancient Cistercian monastery in Heiligenkreuz, some 20 kilometers (12 miles) southwest of Vienna.12 Only
then - on or about 08 June- did officials of the Russian Orthodox Church go on record to confirm that the
future encounter, were it to occur, would be strictly between the Pope and the Moscow Patriarch. 13

Overtures by Pope and Patriarch

Indeed, both sides have long put great store in a meeting of just the two. Since Vatican Council II (19621965) Rome has eagerly sought to promote the cause of Christian Unity, while it is an open secret around the

Vatican that since his election to the See ofPeter in 1978, the Holy Father has hoped not only one day to make
the first pastoral visit of a Roman Pontiffto Russia, but also to preside over celebrations of the Third Christian
Millennium at which the Moscow Patriarch's presence is considered indispensable.
Indeed, some circles in Rome believe the Holy Father has made unnecessary concessions. Driven by a
"calling" to put an end to the "scandal" of Christian division, he has in effect pledged to the Russians- in a
series of encyclicals and official documents - to respect Orthodoxy's ascendance on Russian soil, to prohibit
his own clergy from proselytizing there, and - to the dismay of Ukraine's minority Greek Catholics, liturgically
Byzantine, but in union with the Holy See - to find forms of "full communion" with the Orthodox that would
fall short of the latter's formal submission to papal authority (whose claim to infallibility is in no way
recognized by world Orthodox-y) as had been required in the past14•

12 SeeEdmund Doogue, "Ecumenical Patriarch 'postpones"' Austria visit,"Ecumenical News
International,ENI News Service, 02 June 1997; and the Associate Press dispatch, "Pope To Visit
Austria," 06 June 1997.
13 See the Reuters dispatch out of Moscow, "Roman, Russian Churches Discuss Historic

Meeting," 09 June 1997: "The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church may meet Pope John Paul in
Austria later this month in an unprecedented encounter between the two Christian leaders, a Russian
church official said on Friday. "Talks are now being held between the Vatican and thePatriarchate in
Moscow," said Timofei Zolotusk-y, an official in the Patriarchate's external relations department. "In
all of history there has never been such a meeting," Zolotusky said. " Since talks are being held, it
shows that both sides want it to happen."
14 Many of these documents are contained in "Documentation ofEcumenical Statements and
Initiatives of the Holy See in Regard to Central andEasternEurope in the New Situation - January
1989 - October 1992," a special issue of The Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity's

Information Service, 81: III-IV (1992) and in subsequent issues of the same journal.
These documents are discussed in passing in a series of articles by Ralph Della Cava: "The
Roman Catholic Church in Russia, The Latin Rite: A Five Year Assessment-- Towards a 'Native'
Russian Church?," Harriman Review, 9:4 (Winter), 46-57, also in a Russian translation in Stranitsv
(Moscow), 2:2 (Spring 1997), 230-251; "Religious Resource Networks: Roman Catholic Philanthropy
in Central andEastEurope" in Transnational Religion and Fading States, edited by Susan Rudolph
19

Not a few Roman critics believe the papacy has gone too far. Yet. shortly after Heiligenkreuz was
canceled, it might be said that the Holy Father went even farther. In his Sunday homily at St. Peter's on 22 June
1997, he declared that "reconciliation must involve everyone ... all the people of Europe ... from the Atlantic
to the Urals, from East to West." Then, in an obvious allusion to rescheduling his meeting with Aleksiy II, he
underscored the "urgency" to overcome "'still open problems and sometimes unexpected upsets ...'"15
For his part. Aleksiy IT is no less intent in promoting the unity of the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic"
Church (a defmition of early church councils which, incidentally, is held in common by Orthodox and
Catholics as well as many reformation Christians). He said as much in his 1994 Christmas address on Vatican
Radio and has reiterated that view subsequently. Moreover, in the aftermath of his canceled meeting with the
Pope, he wrote the Holy Father, insisting on "'continuing the dialogue underway,'" and expressing the wish
(according to the papal press secretary) '"that this meeting will be able to take place.'"16 As recently as 15
January 1998, at the closing of the regular twice yearly "bi-lateral conversations" between the Holy See and
the Patriarchate, he reportedly again "voiced his willingness to attend such a meeting and to continue the
dialogue,'' although not until "obstacles" to the same were overcome.17

Benefits to Moscow
Indeed, for Russian Orthodoxy such a meeting has broad significance. In at least three respects, Moscow
would have much to gain from it.
First of all, it would likely result not only in establishing direct access to Rome at the highest echelon, but
would also do so by sidestepping Constantinople entirely. For, although the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been
reduced in modern times in both numbers and resources, it has nonetheless successfully retained its historic
ascendance over the highly divided Orthodox world and does so in part by serving as its principal "broker"
and interlocutor between its faithful and Christians of other confessions.
In fact, Constantinople was not only among the first to champion Orthodox membership in the World

and James Piscatori for the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research
Council (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 173-211; and in the author's still unpublished essay "The
Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement - Considerations on Continuing Relations
(Spring 1997)," (Spring 1997), Pp. 23.
15 As broadcast by the BBC on the night of 22 June 1997 and reported by Reuters from. Vatican
City and summarized in "Pope Appeals for Christians to Reconcile,'' The Moscow Times, 24 June 1997, 4.
16 "Meeting ofPatriarch, Pope Canceled over Differences,'' The Moscow Times, 14 June
1997, 3.
17 For recent reiterations, see the dispatches from Moscow of 15 and 16 January 1998,
respectively, an untitled Associated Press article and Reuters' "Russian Orthodoxy, Vatican Fail to
Mend Fences,'' as re-transmitted by: news@holy-trinity.org
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Council of Churches, now under broad attack by Orthodox co nservatives, but in 1967 under the late Patriarch,
His All Holiness, Athenagoras I, it also opened up a dialogue with the popes of Rome that has continued to
this day.
Until late, the papacy has always accorded a measure of preeminence to its relations with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate. For that very reason, an exclusive meeting between John Paul II and Aleksiy II can probably be
viewedas a nuanced shift in Rome's priorities and its tacit acknowledgment of Moscow's potentially greater
role than Constantinople's in the now multi-polar world of religious dialogue that has emerged in the post-Cold
War era.
Incontrovertibly, Moscow's boast of60 million nominal Orthodox believers inside Russia and better than
40 million more in neighboring Ukraine and Belarus alone makes it the single largest Orthodox Church in the
world But outside Russia, that boast could be made empty. In those very same newly independent countries
(once part of the former USSR), various nationalist forces, especially in Ukraine, openly deny - as did the
Estonians - the Moscow Patriarchate's continuing claim of canonical authority over these distant Orthodox
faithful now residing in nations of their own.

The "Ukrainian Problem"
Indeed, the "Ukrainian" problem (one so multi-faceted and complex that it requires patient explanation
here) - and the chance to gain from Rome advantages for a Russian Orthodoxy that is now under ftre across
Russia's very borders - was surely a second reason for the Heiligenkreuz meeting.
What precisely might Moscow have hoped to gain? First of all, a more strenuous "taming" by Rome of
the five million-strong Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Established 400 years ago as a Byzantine
rite in union with the See of Peter, it was "phoenix-like" reborn in the late eighties after having been legally
"abolished" by Soviet authorities in 1946 and its properties and faithful "absorbed" by the Moscow
Patriarchate. The post-Soviet era "battles" to repossess churches, monasteries and entire bodies of parishioners
have still not been fully resolved. Indeed, both sides periodically claim that some of their respective
communities still suffer from "oppression and persecution" -- perpetrated either by the faithful of the "other"
confession or, as is not infrequently the case, powerful local political leaders partisan to one or another church
(or their own re-election).
In the mid-nineties, the UGCC - historically centered in Western Ukraine (and whose members Russian
Orthodox pejoratively call "Uniates") - seems to have embarked on a "policy of 'national recognition,"' by
situating new churches in the traditionally Orthodox Central and Eastern regions. (UGCC's critics condemn
this course as an undeclared "policy of expansion;" whether it enjoys Rome's tacit approval also appears a
matter of considerable dispute).
Probably equally disconcerting to Moscow is the expressed intent of the UGCC to elevate its presiding
Cardinal and Metropolitan in Lwiw to the rank of a Byzantine rite Patriarch (a rank historically never accorded

21

him) and then to move the would-be new see to Kyiw, Ukraine's capital and millennia! birthplace of ancient
Rus's Slavic Orthodox Christianity. No less distressing has been the cordial relations Greek Catholics have
maintained with the three nationalist Orthodox "currents" (that call themselves churches and as such are
juridically fully incorporated in Ukraine).
Not only do the latter dissent canonically- and patriotically, in their opinion- from the authority of the
Moscow Patriarchate. But- in outright defiance of the Russian Orthodox Church of which they were once a
part- two of these have also established their own "Patriarchate of Kiev and of all Rus-Ukraine." To add insult
to injury, one of these self-proclaimed patriarchs,Filaret (Denisenko), was himself the former Metropolitan
of Kiev of the Russian Orthodox Church, a member of its Holy Synod, and even a losing candidate in the
patriarchal succession of 1990 (when the office was conferred upon Aleksiy m. Consequently, from the
Moscow Patriarchate's perspective,Filaret's persistence in the "rump" office of "Patriarch of Kiev" amounted
to condemnable perfidy and so justified not only the disciplinary actions meted out to him since 1994, but also
in the face of his "disobedience" the order of excommunication decreed inFebruary 1997 by the Russian
Church's bienniel Bishops' Council.18
Thus, whatever discomfort the Greek Catholics may cause, it is this troika of Ukrainian Orthodox
Churches - numbering from a fifth to a third of the country's approximately 40 million nominal Orthodox (and
whose histories and current politics cannot be broached here) - which is in the opinion of many observers the
real threat to the Moscow Patriarchate's future.19
How so?
Suffice it to recall here that from the time of the Soviet army occupation of Western Ukraine in 1946 (then
a part of Poland) until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Orthodox and Greek Catholics together (the
latter then were "crypto-Greek Catholics"), hailing mostly from Western Ukraine and amounting to between
a fifth and a third of the country's population, had together provided better than a third of all the seminarians

18 With regard to the excommunication ofFilaret, see the "Russian Orthodox Church: Act on
[sic] Excommunication of the monkFilaret [Mikhail Antonovich] Denisenko," dated 23February
1997 and available on line from the Moscow Patriarchate's website at: http.//www.russian-orthodox
church.org.ru/sobor09e.htm# I
19 The components of this "troika" are: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kievan Patriarchate;
the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with its own Patriarch in Kiev; and a schismatic faction of
the latter (these are discussed elsewhere in this footnote and in note 20 below).
On Ukrainian Orthodox church rivalries and varying statistics, see the scholarship ofFrank
Sysyn, Serguei Plochiy, and Bohdan Bociurkiw varyingly published in the journal, Religion. State &
Society: the newspaper The Ukrainian Weekly; and in Michael Bourdeaux,The Politics of Religion
in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
For a recent account of current problems and interviews with Archbishop Mefodiy ofTemopolis
and Podolsk of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (whose Patriarch is Dimitriy and against
whom a new schism has erupted, thus creating a "second" Ukrainian Autocephalous Church), see the
articles in NG-Religii, 5 (May 1997), the very informative monthly supplement on religion, begun in
January 1997, of the Moscow daily newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
..
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and clergy of the entire Russian Orthodox Church as well as a goodly portion - as much as a third - of its
annual revenues. At the major theological academies of Zagorsk (outside Moscow and called today Sergey
Posad) and St Petersburg, it was a standing joke that the "Ukrainians" had taken over the Russian Church.20

Ofcourse, today, it is not the privation per se of these human and material resources from Moscow that
is critical (indeed, the Russian Church has made miraculous progress in the last five years in creating a
substantial and independent economic base for itself). But, rather it is their commitment since independence
by these now self·sufficient confessions to apply their own substantial resources to the cause of unifying all
three of the anti-Moscow currents of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into a single new "Patriarchate ofKyiw and All
Rus-Ukraine" -- one enjoying eventual autocephaly and thus no longer dependent on Moscow.
Indeed, Moscow's fear of just such a direction led it late (in 1992), reluctantly, and as a largely tactical
measure to grant a modicum of administrative "autonomy" to the current Russian Orthodox "Metropolitan of
Kiev and all Ukraine" and his thirty-three prelates. Technically speaking, that step also holds out the promise
of Kiev's one day gaining full autocephaly. But, because these churchmen still remain (by church law and
choice) loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate - despite Ukraine's independence - and however much this position
is canonically "correct,"21 many Ukrainians are not assuaged. Moreover, that the said Metropolitan continues
to sit officially on the Holy Synod, the important interim governing body of the Russian Church, as do his
prelates at its biennial Bishops' Councils, makes their claim for being a genuinely "autonomous" Ukrainian
Church all the more implausible to Ukrainian nationalists.
Three other factors seem to be working against Moscow's middle-run retention of influence over its
Ukrainian Church. For one, popular support for the three Orthodox currents mentioned above and their

20 The role of Ukraine within the Moscow Patriarchate just prior to the dissolution of the
USSR (1989-1990) is sensitively described by the American Greek Orthodox Deacon, Anthony Ugolnik,
"Burdened with History- Soviet Churches & The Search for Authenticity," Commonweal (21 December
1990), 751-756.

21 Canonically, a church may not declare itself either autonomous or autocephalous. Rather,
it can appeal to its "mother church" for such independence and then -- wait. The Ecumenical Patriarchate
may intervene to hasten and sanction the results of the process.
In the case ofFilaret (Denisenko), the former Russian Orthodox Church's Metropolitan of
Kiev, he had himself declared Patriarch of Kiev and all Rus-Ukraine -- after having lost out to Aleksiy II
in the June 1990 election to fill the post of Patriarch of Moscow!
For the Ukrainian Orthodox still loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and headed by Metropolitan
Vladimir (Sabodan),Filaret is a fraud and usurper. Indeed, at the ROC's Bishops' Council convened in
Moscow inFebruary1997 he was formally excommunicated for "anti-church activities," criminally
ignoring an earlier church decree of banishment, performing "consecrations without possessing the holy
priesthood," for daring "to call himself 'patriarch of Kiev and Rus-Ukraine', while the ancient throne of
Kiev is lawfully occupied by a canonical representative of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the rank of
metropolitan" who is in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate; see "Russian Orthodox Church: Act
on [sic] Excommunication of the monkFilaret [Mikhail Antonovich] Denisenko," dated 23February
1997 and available on line from the Moscow Patriarchate's website at: http://www.russian-orthodox
church.org.ru/sobor09e.htm# I
23

campaign for a fully independent Kievan-based Orthodoxy continues enthusiastic, even if the number of
worshippers, parishes and dioceses appear to have remained stable over the last few years.
For another, outside Russia and the former Soviet Union some other "autocephalous" (fully self
governing) churches and prominent Orthodox clergy have expressed complete sympathy for Ukraine's cause
and its �licit right to its own Patriarchate.22 In that context, Constantinople's ready defense of Estonia was
widely construed as a step towards its eventual endorsement ofUkraine.23

(In that light, Moscow's temporary,

but disproportionately aggressive break with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in early 1996 appears far more
understandable). For still another, the prospect of a Kievan Patriarchate enjoys broad support from among
Ukraine's politicians - across party lines and at every level of government. They have simply not yet reached
a consensus on the tactics - either at home or in diplomatic circles - necessary to bring this about.

Moscow on the World Stage?
Of course, what specific action Moscow expects of Rome in regard to the Orthodox situation in Ukraine
is hard to say. Surely, a major aim is to halt the further decline of Russian church influence there and in several
bordering states (where in Soviet times it had enjoyed an effective monopoly).24 In the very least, a meeting
of the Pope and Patriarch would fmally allow Moscow - on its own merits - to have Rome's ear just as
Constantinople has long had.
Moreover, such a meeting could bring a third and last boon to Moscow: the occasion to reveal itself on
the world stage as a "major player" in the religious politics and strivings of our times. That stage has so far
escaped it, while few of the world's personalities can command it with the same success as does Pope John
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A 1989 or 1990 article by the Rev. Basil Osborne, the Orthodox Auxiliary Bishop of Sourozh

(Great Britai), published in the British Orthodox journal, Sourozh, argued early and strongly in favor of the
Moscow Patriarchate's full endorsement of autocephaly for a Kievan Patriarchate; although I was informed
of this article by a reliable source, I have not yet been able to verifY it.
23 See the Rev. Kallistos Ware, "The Estonian Crisis: A Salutary Warning?," Sobornost (Oxford),

18:2 (1996), 59-68.
24 In public, the Moscow Patriarchate insists on an end to Catholic proselytism, to Rome's
further extension of ecclesiastical structures inside Russia, and to its support of the Greek Catholics in
Ukraine, demands that Rome could hardly meet.
As to what Rome may have expected in exchange is also difficult to say. But few would
dismiss the hope for a pastoral visit by the Holy Father to the Catholics of Russia, an undertaking that
can hardly be expected to be easily agreed to at this juncture. Even were President Boris Yeltsin to
extend such an invitation, Rome would unlikely accept were the Moscow Patriarchate to oppose it.
Evidence of such a Vatican goal is only indirect: thus far, the Holy Father has put off several
ecclesiastical requests for a papal visit to Ukraine, an option whose consequence would likely be to
foreclose for a long time to come any papal visit to Russia.
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Paul IP5
The truth of the matter is that Orthodoxy in general and Russian Orthodoxy specifically have remained
just "beyond the pale" of the global media.l6 As to Aleksiy II, none of his important trips abroad (neither to
Germany nor the United States) has yet "put him on the map, " not even his strenuous June 1997 pilgrimage
to the Holy Land. In fact, press reports of his support of the Palestinians sounded more reminiscent of the
SovietUnion's one-time anti- I sraeli policy than of one of the visit's intended goals "back home, " viz., to help
garner support from amongRussia's twenty- two million nominal Moslems, who make up the country's second
largest faith.27
Graz, or Vienna, or Heiligenkreuz - any one of them might just have been center stage.

Why the CanceUation

If so much was riding on the meeting, why did the Russians cancel it? Why did they do so literally after
all the major joint pronouncements were said to have already been- in the opinion of observers close to the
Vatican, but publicly denied by the Moscow Patriarchate - "signed, sealed and delivered?" And finally why
did they do so on the night of the tenth of June- at a supposedly unscheduled meeting of the Holy Synod that
had been organized on the spot only hours earlier during the reception celebrating the sixth anniversary of
Aleksiy II's "enthronement" as Patriarch?
The Patriarchate's official press release put the blame on the Vatican, contending that its representatives
had "at the last minute ... removed passages from a planned joint declaration which were of crucial importance
for theRussian Orthodox Church."28 It then enumerated a litany of grievances which have been substantially

25 Elsewhere, this Pope's relationship to media, media's decisive role in promoting religions'
own objectives (despite the supposed bias against religious beliefs and the discourse of faith), and the
supposedly "unlimited" world-wide power of media specifically rooted in the West to promote
(inordinately, in the opinion of some) the historic faiths of the West have been widely discussed in
several places. See, among others, Ralph Della Cava, "Vatican Policy, 1978-1991: An Updated

Overview, " SocialResearch, 59: I (Spring 1992), pp. 169- 199.

26 See "Orthodoxy Faces Media Bias in North America, US Expert Contends, " Orthodox
Press Service, 1:6 [New Series], 15 July 1997, an on-line news service, edited inByalistok, Poland by
the Orthodox Youth Movement and available via: syndesmos@telbank.pl

1997, 4.

27 Said Ghazali, "Alexy Asks Arafat to Aid LandReform, " The Moscow Times, 18 June

28 Andrei Zolotov,.�'Alexy.Blames Pope for Cancellation, " The Moscow Times, 17 June 1997,
3. A fuller account can be found in the interview with the Moscow Patriarchate's Chancellor, Archbishop
Sergiy of Solnechnogorsk, published as "Dialog Neobchodim, No Vstrecha Neymestna, " in the NG-Religii
supplement No.6 (June 1997) of the weekly Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 June 1997, 3. In it, the Chancellor

makes the Pope directly responsible for "overturning "a series of previous conditions agreed upon by both
sides concerning the preparation of the meeting." He went on to say that "the major problem ... touched on
the draft of the final document from which-- at the very last minute-- Vatican representatives excised
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the same over the past couple of years and had certainly not altered in any significant way within the previous
week or two after both sides had apparently finnly committed themselves to the meeting.29
What, then, really lies behind the cancellation? Answers other than official ones have simply been
unavailable from either side. But one piece of speculatioq that made the rounds of Moscow diplomatic and
church circles can be summe d up in one word: Ukraine!
But, not exactly for the reasons cited in the press conference. Rather, as the rumor had it, Ukraine's
Orthodox ecclesiastics loyal to Moscow had actually lobbied hard against the meeting. In their minds, it would
have only strengthened the hand of the "uniates" and their "friends" in the Orthodox "Kievan Patriarchate."
Joining these Ukrainian "Moscovites" was probably the "anti-Polish," ultra-conservative faction of Russian
prelates who have consistently labeled ecumenism a heresy and who played a key, but unsuccessful role at
ROC's FebruBiy 1997 biennial Bishops' Council to end ties to non-Orthodox Christians. Moreover, these
lobbyists had mounted their campaign just two weeks or so after the Georgian Orthodox Church ended its
membership in the World Council of Churches and while anti-ecumenical forces in the Serbian Orthodox
Church were gathering strength to do the same.30
Those second-guessing this situation further speculated that neither Aleksiy II nor Kirill, the Metropolitan
of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, a champion of ecumenism, since 1989 the experienced Director of the
Patriarchate's Department of External Church Relations, and a key proponent of the meeting between Pope
and Patriarch, had anticipated the ex1ent and depth of the internal opposition. Had they done so, the argument
continues, they would never have led Rome on. When they perceived the danger - indeed, at the eleventh hour
- they convened the impromptu session of the Holy Synod on whose shoulders, rather than on their own, the
decision to cancel has since rested. As a result, the Patriarch was free to address a personal letter to the Pope
immediately thereafter reiterating his wish "'that this meeting will be able to take place."'

Perhaps Soon
Indeed, no one speaks of losers. Nor does anyone dare suggest that the Russian church may simply be too

mired in its own past and so still "unprepared," psychologically and theologically, to catch up with the sense

such issues as the Uniates and their position in Western Ukraine and all questions connected with the
condemnation of proselytism." I have been unable to confirm the accounts of either side.
29 The two basic charges reported were: "Latin" Catholic proselytism in Russia; and, "uniate"
(Greek Catholic) activities in Russia, Belarus and Western Ukraine; again, see the interview with the
Moscow Patriarchate's Chancellor, Archbishop Sergiy of Solnechnogorsk, published as "Dialog

Ncobchodim, No Vstrecha Neymestna," in the NG-Religii supplement No. 6 (June 1997), cited in
note 28.

30 See Andrei Zolotov, "Georgian Orthodox Church to leave WCC and CEC," Ecumenical
News Service, 26 May 1997; and Fr. Sava [sic], "Possible Withdrawal of the Serbian [Orthodox]
Church from WCC, 21 June 1997; both available on-line from: news@.holy-trinity.org
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of ecumenism prevailing today in West Europe. At least, not publicly.31
Rather, the statements from both sides, but especially from Catholic quarters, reinforce the Patriarch's
hope "'that this meeting will be able to take place.'" Perhaps, the common vision of pope and patriarch putting
an end to the "scandal" of Christianity's divisions and giving welcome to the Third Christian Millennium

together in full solidarity may yet bring about the still unprecedented encounter. Nor can its historical
significance be lost on both protagonists whose wills may yet win out over advancing age and failing health. 32
Time is short, but in the end it never fails to reveal on whose side it was on.

31 In private church circles, Orthodox and Catholic, both views have been heard expressed:
for one, that the patriarchs of Rome, Moscow and Constantinople all "lost" a golden opportunity; for
another, that a millennium of isolation and division is much harder for the Russian Orthodox Church
to overcome because its great church reforms begun in 1917 -- long preceeding those of the Second
Vatican Council (1962 to 1965) -- were aborted by the Bolshevik Revolution and its ensuing dvelopment.
32 At 68, Patriarch Aleksiy II suffers from a heart condition which he has supposedly had
monitored at American hospitals during his trips to the States; most recently, while in Austria, he
collapsed during a three-hour religious service, according to "News in Brief," The Philadelphia Inguirer,
"International Section," 23 June, 1997.

Pope John Paul II's health contiDues to decline, although according to a recent visitor, "his
mind remains as alert as ever."
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